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Abstract
Collusion-Resistant
Cost-Sharing Mechanisms:
Design Techniques, Analyses, Trade-Offs
Florian Schoppmann
How can a system be designed so that autonomous self-interested players behave
in a “desirable” way? In this thesis, we study this question in the context of cost-
sharing problems, where finitely many players have an unknown valuation for some
non-rivalrous but excludable service (e.g., network connectivity). The challenge is to
design mechanisms that elicit truthful reports of the players’ valuations, determine which
set of players Q to serve, and decide how to distribute the incurred service cost C(Q). So
in particular, a cost-sharing mechanism has to give players an incentive to reveal truthful
information. Further constraints for cost-sharing problems include budget balance (i.e.,
recovery of the service cost with the prices charged) and economic efficiency (i.e., a
reasonable trade-off between the service cost and the excluded players’ valuations).
Practical applications moreover require that cost-sharing mechanisms are computable in
polynomial time.
Cost-sharing problems are fundamental in economics and have a broad area of ap-
plications; e.g., distributing volume discounts in electronic commerce, sharing the cost
of public infrastructure projects, allocating development costs of low-volume built-to-
order products, etc. Despite this fundamental nature, general techniques for solving
cost-sharing problems are rare. When requiring group-strategyproofness—i.e., collusion
resistance in a very strong sense—essentially only one technique has been known, the
so-called Moulin mechanisms. Unfortunately, there are several natural cost-sharing
problems for which any Moulin mechanism inevitably suffers poor budget balance and
economic efficiency.
In this thesis, we devise several alternative techniques for designing cost-sharing
mechanisms. We demonstrate the benefits of our novel techniques by applying them to
various natural cost-sharing problems where the costs C(Q) are induced by combinatorial
optimization problems. Moreover, we provide characterization results that contribute
towards understanding the inherent limitations of collusion resistance with respect to
the other desirable properties of cost-sharing mechanisms.
